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ABSTRACT 
 
Institutional investors such as pension funds or insurance companies commonly invest in the 
unsecuritized and securitized real estate market. We investigate how institutional investor 
sentiment in the commercial real estate market affects institutional trading behavior in the 
REIT market and subsequently asset pricing. In particular, we test two alternative theories - 
flight to liquidity and style investing theory - to explain the sentiment-induced trading 
behavior of institutional investors in the REIT market for the pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis 
(2007-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2012) period. We find that the applicability of either 
theory depends on economic conditions. In the pre-crisis period institutional investors 
switched capital in and out of REITs based on their sentiment in the private market (style 
investing). However, in the crisis period institutional investors switched capital from the 
illiquid private market to the more liquid REIT market (flight to liquidity). The flight to more 
liquid REITs continued into the post-crisis to a lesser extent and suggests that the financial 
crisis has changed institutional investment behavior. Our findings hold across different 
groups of REITs (e.g. high and low institutional ownership, S&P and non-S&P REITs) and 
property types. We also find that institutional real estate investor sentiment introduces a 
non-fundamental component into REIT pricing.  
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Introduction 
Over the last couple of decades a number of studies have shown that fundamentals are not 
sufficient to explain the comovement of asset returns (e.g. Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; 
Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993, 1990; Shiller, 1989). Investor sentiment has been identified as an 
additional driver of comovement of assets that either form a category or are in the habitat of a 
particular investor type (Barberis, Schleifer and Wurgler, 2005). The majority of studies 
investigating sentiment-induced comovement focus on the stock market and neglect assets that 
are simultaneously traded in securitized and unsecuritized markets. However, particularly these 
assets represent a unique laboratory to understand the role of investor sentiment in the 
comovement of assets across and within asset categories, classes and markets.  
Real estate represents an asset class for which a securitized and unsecuritized market coexist. 
Both markets are used by institutional investors to obtain exposure to the “real estate category” 
and provide data about transaction activity, returns and investor sentiment. Institutional real 
estate investors commonly invest in real estate via investments in commercial real estate and 
publicly traded real estate investment trusts (REITs; Dhar and Goetzmann, 2006; Clayton and 
MacKinnon, 2003a; Ciochetti et al., 2002). Exposure to the private real estate market provides 
institutional investors with an information advantage about fundamentals when they trade REITs, 
whose pricing is ultimately driven by underlying asset values (Graff and Young, 1997). 
However, it also makes them susceptible to irrational sentiment, which is recognized to be an 
important component of investor decision-making in the highly intransparent, informationally 
inefficient and segmented commercial real estate market (Gallimore and Gray, 2002). As a 
consequence, the following two questions arise:  
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 How does institutional investor sentiment in the unsecuritized market affect institutional 
investor trading in the securitized market?  
 How does institutional investor sentiment affect asset pricing in the securitized market? 
 
The real estate laboratory offers a unique opportunity to assess the impact of sentiment in the 
unsecuritized market on institutional trading behavior and asset pricing decisions in the 
securitized market. In this study, we investigate this relationship over the period of 2002 to 2012 
by testing the applicability of the style investing and flight to liquidity theory, which are two 
alternative sentiment-based theories of comovement (Baker and Wurgler, 2007; Barberis, 
Schleifer and Wurgler, 2005). In particular, we test the explanatory power of the two theories for 
different periods: pre-crisis (2002 to 2006), crisis (2007 to 2009) and post-crisis (2010 to 2012). 
These periods are motivated by the findings of Devos et al. (2013) who show that institutional 
investment preferences in REITs changed around the most recent financial crisis. 
The style investing theory predicts a capital switching in and out of the “real estate 
category”, which includes securitized real estate assets (e.g. REIT stocks) and unsecuritized real 
estate assets (e.g. commercial real estate), based on the sentiment of institutional investors in the 
underlying private market. The flight to liquidity theory predicts a sentiment-induced capital 
switching from illiquid unsecuritized investments to more liquid securitized assets due to 
perceived liquidity risk. Previous studies provide evidence for both, an institutional style 
investing in REITs (Ambrose, Lee and Peek, 2007; Graff and Young, 1997) as well as a flight to 
quality/liquidity within the REIT market (Devos et al., 2013) or capital switching between REIT 
and commercial real estate market (Lee, Lee and Chiang, 2008).  
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The purpose of our study is to combine the extensive literatures on style investing, institutional 
herding behavior and flight to liquidity/quality to explain the effect of sentiment in the 
unsecurititized real estate market on institutional REIT trading behavior, and create a link 
between the findings of these earlier studies. We also analyze whether institutional investor 
sentiment in the unsecuritized market adds a component delinked from fundamentals into asset 
pricing in the securitized market in line with the investor sentiment literature (e.g. Baker and 
Wurgler, 2007; Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; De Long et al. 
1990, 1989) and institutional investor herding literature (e.g. Choi and Sias, 2009; Sias, 2004; 
Nofsinger and Sias, 1999).  
We find evidence for the applicability of both theories, albeit at different points in time, 
characterized by different economic conditions. In the pre-crisis period from 2002 to 2006, the 
sentiment-driven REIT trading behavior of institutional investors is best explained by style 
investing suggesting that institutional investors switched capital in and out of the real estate 
category based on their unsecuritized market sentiment. However, during the financial crisis 
from 2007 to 2009, the flight to liquidity theory best explains institutional trading behavior in the 
securitized market (i.e. REITs), suggesting a sentiment-induced capital switching from the 
illiquid unsecuritized to the more liquid securitized market to adjust portfolio weights within the 
real estate category. The flight to liquidity theory also best explains the effect of private market 
sentiment on institutional trading in the REIT market in the post-crisis period from 2010 to 2012, 
which suggests that the financial crisis has changed institutional investment behavior. Our 
findings are in line with Devos et al. (2013), and complement this earlier study by providing 
evidence that an institutional flight to quality/liquidity does not only exist within the REIT 
market, but also between the unsecuritized and securitized real estate market.  
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Our results hold for securities forming the habitat of institutional investors (i.e. REITs included 
in the S&P500 index and with high institutional ownership), securities forming the habitat of 
individual investors (i.e. REITs not included in the S&P index and with low institutional 
ownership) and across REITs with different property type specializations. Additionally, we find 
that the sentiment of institutional investors in the unsecuritized market affects asset pricing in the 
securitized market. 
Our study contributes to the style investing, herding and flight to liquidity/quality 
literatures as follows. First, we provide empirical evidence that institutions not only style invest 
across different types of stocks, but also across the securitized and unsecuritized real estate 
market. We also show that investor sentiment in the informationally inefficient unsecuritized 
market affects institutional investment across the real estate category and asset pricing decisions 
in the securitized market. Thus, there appears to be a spillover of sentiment between markets 
within the same asset category. Second, we provide evidence that the flight to liquidity/quality 
theory is not only applicable to the stock market or stock & bond market, but also to the 
unsecuritized and securitized real estate market. Last, our results suggest that the flight to 
liquidity and style investing theory are complements, depending on economic conditions.  
Furthermore, our study contributes to the existing literature on investor sentiment in 
private and public real estate markets. With the exception of Ling, Naranjo and Scheick (2013), 
previous REIT investor sentiment studies focus on individual investors (Lin, Rahman and Yung, 
2009; Chiang and Lee, 2009; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003a; Barkham and Ward, 1999). 
Traditionally, institutional investors have been considered to behave rationally and trade on 
expectations about fundamentals (Anand, Chakravarty and Martell, 2005; Brown and Cliff, 
2004; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003; De Long et al. 1990, 1989). However, previous studies on 
 
5 
institutional herding and momentum trading in REIT and non-REIT stocks (e.g. Ro and 
Gallimore, 2013; Sias, 2004; Badrinath and Wahal, 2002; Nofsinger and Sias, 1999) suggest that 
institutional investment decisions may not be entirely based on rational expectations about the 
future. The focus on institutional investors is particularly relevant, as institutional ownership in 
REITs has been continuously increasing since the beginning of the new “REIT era” (Devos et 
al., 2013; Lee, Lee and Chiang, 2008; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003b; Below, Stansell and 
Coffin, 2000; Graff and Young, 1997). Our study also complements previous studies such as 
Below, Stansell and Coffin (2000), who investigate fundamentals-based determinants of 
institutional demand in REIT stocks in line with traditional capital asset pricing theory, by 
analyzing behavioral determinants of institutional investor demand for REITs. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: The next section discusses our 
theoretical foundation presenting a literature review. We then describe the data and methodology 
used in our study. Finally, we present our main results for both institutional REIT trading and 
pricing, followed by our conclusion.   
 
Literature Review 
Alongside more traditional asset pricing theory, a growing stream of literature finds that 
underlying fundamentals are not sufficient to explain the excess comovement of different assets 
(Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993, 1990; Shiller, 1989). 
Sentiment-based theories such as the category (style investing) and habitat theory offer 
alternative and behavioral explanations for how investor sentiment affects the comovement of 
asset returns (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005).  
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Barberis and Shleifer (2003) refer to a category or “style” to define a group of risky assets that 
investors treat homogeneously and hence do not consider competing in their demand function. 
After combining assets into broader classes, investors then make portfolio allocation decisions at 
the category level instead of the individual asset level (“style investing”). In particular, investors 
categorize assets into superordinate styles and allocate funds to these categories based on the 
category’s past performance relative to other categories. If a category has a relatively superior 
performance to others, switchers withdraw funds from underperforming categories and invest 
them in this overperforming category. As a consequence, regardless of cash flows, which may be 
either highly (e.g. utilities stocks) or weakly correlated (e.g. closed end funds), assets within the 
same category tend to comove (Barberis and Shleifer, 2003).  
Empirical evidence for the category theory (style investing) has been found, for example, 
in “Siamese twins” companies traded in different markets (Froot and Dabora, 1999), 
commodities (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1990), stocks in the same index (Barberis, Shleifer and 
Wurgler, 2005; Chen and Bondt, 2004), companies of the same size but different lines of 
business (Pindyck and Rotemberg, 1993), Morningstar categories (Teo and Woo, 2004), stocks 
with similar prices (Green and Hwang, 2009), and stocks with other similar characteristics 
(Wahal and Yavuz, 2013; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Investigating the comovement of two 
overlapping stock market categories (REITs and S&P index stocks), Ambrose, Lee and Peek 
(2007) find that after certain REITs were added to S&P indices, both “index” and “non-index” 
REITs comove with the S&P index stocks. Furthermore, institutional investors in particular have 
been found to herd from and to styles, for example, with regard to stock portfolios of particular 
characteristics (e.g. growth stocks or market capitalization) and industries (Choi and Sias, 2009; 
Froot and Teo, 2008).  
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A number of studies find that unsecuritized and securitized real estate returns comove (Pagliari, 
Scherer and Monopoli, 2005; Myer and Webb, 1993; Giliberto, 1990). Pagliari, Scherer and 
Monopoli (2005) argue that public and private real estate are interchangeable from a portfolio 
management perspective. This suggests the existence of a “real estate category”, based on the 
real estate industry, in which investors style-invest in line with Choi and Sias (2009). Graff and 
Young (1997) present evidence that institutional investors herd in and out of REIT stocks, based 
on the performance of the underlying commercial real estate market. If institutional investors 
indeed style-invest in the real estate category, we expect a positive relationship between the 
sentiment of institutional investors in the private market and their trading behavior in the public 
market.  
The flight to liquidity theory, which has evolved from the noise-trader or habitat theory, 
offers an alternative explanation for sentiment-induced REIT trading of institutional investors. 
According to this theory (Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991; De Long et al., 1989, 1990), noise 
trading by individual investors increases the systematic risk of assets that are in the preferred 
habitat of individual investors, and exposes rational investors to an additional risk delinked from 
fundamentals that cannot be arbitraged away. For real estate, the noise-trader theory has been 
empirically supported by a number of studies on individual investor sentiment in REITs (Lin, 
Rahman and Yung, 2009; Chiang and Lee, 2009; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003a; Barkham and 
Ward, 1999).  
However, Baker and Wurgler (2007) argue that noise trading also results in a flight to 
quality within the stock market. For example, in times of high sentiment characterized by 
increased volatility due to higher noise trading (Yu and Yuan, 2011), some investors move away 
from small, high growth and more volatile stocks whose prices are often driven by irrational 
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sentiment, towards safe, more “bond-like” stocks, whose prices are less likely to be affected by 
sentiment. Amihud, Mendelson and Wood (1990) suggest that the flight to quality should be 
interpreted as a flight to liquidity. A number of studies provide empirical support for the flight to 
quality/liquidity theory within and across asset markets such as the bond and stock market 
(Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009; Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Beber, Brandt and Kavajecz, 
2008; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Vayanos, 2004; Ilmanen, 2003).  
With regard to the REIT market, Devos et al. (2013) find that institutional investments 
depend on REIT performance and economic conditions. The financial crisis led to a flight to 
quality of institutional REIT investors towards lower risk REITs, which led to an increase in 
institutional ownership in older and larger REITs in the post-crisis period. These REITs have 
been traditionally the habitat of institutional investors (Below, Stansell and Coffin, 2000). 
During the crisis, institutional investors exhibited a preference for REITs with higher turnover. 
As stocks with high turnover can be considered more liquid (Baker and Stein, 2004), this finding 
suggests a flight to liquidity within the REIT market.  
An important characteristic of institutional real estate investors is their high sensitivity to 
illiquidity risk in the unsecuritized real estate market (Dhar and Goetzmann, 2006) and hence 
their preference for more liquid securitized real estate assets (Ciochetti, Craft and Shilling, 
2002). Liquidity is an important distinction between direct and indirect real estate investments 
(Pagliari, Scherer and Monopoli, 2005). Clayton and MacKinnon (2003a) find that the liquidity 
premium in REIT prices relative to net asset values is related to the liquidity of the underlying 
commercial real estate market. Additionally, institutional investors have also been found to 
consider unsecuritized and securitized real estate as substitutes and switch their investments 
(capital) between these two markets (Lee, Lee and Chiang, 2008). As a consequence, if 
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institutional investors switch capital from the illiquid unsecuritized to the more liquid securitized 
real estate market (flight to liquidity), we expect a negative relationship between the sentiment of 
institutional investors in the private market and their trading behavior in the public market.  
 
Data Description 
Institutional Investor Sentiment for Private Real Estate 
In the investor sentiment literature, sentiment is measured with either the closed end fund 
discount (CEFD), surveys or cash flow imbalances/trading activity. Previous studies on REIT 
investor sentiment predominantly employ the CEFD or discount to net asset value approach, 
which however, is inappropriate for our investigation for a number of reasons. The indirect 
CEFD measure does not allow us to isolate institutional investor sentiment and also has been 
found to proxy primarily for individual investor sentiment (De Long and Shleifer, 1992; Lee, 
Shleifer and Thaler, 1991). Findings about the appropriateness of the CEFD measure as investor 
sentiment proxy furthermore have been mixed in the finance literature (Gemmill and Thomas, 
2002; Neal and Wheatley, 1998; Doukas and Milonas, 2004; Sias, Starks and Tinic 2001; Elton, 
Gruber and Busse 1998; Chen, Kan and Miller, 1993).  
To measure the sentiment of institutional investors in the unsecuritized commercial real 
estate market, we follow Ling, Naranjo and Scheick (2013) and Clayton, Ling and Naranjo 
(2009) and employ a survey-based measure, which is based on data from the Real Estate 
Research Corporation (RERC) over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. The RERC surveys 
institutional investors such as pension funds, insurance companies or investment managers 
involved in the commercial real estate market on a quarterly basis. Respondents are asked to 
provide information such as expectations about yields, growth rates and investment conditions in 
all major commercial real estate market segments (office, industrial, retail, apartment and hotel).  
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In particular, we focus on the rankings of current investment conditions for office, industrial, 
retail, apartment and hotel. Respondents are asked to rate the current investment conditions from 
“poor” (1) to “excellent” (10). These rankings are direct measures of investor sentiment in the 
unsecuritized real estate market as they represent the expectations of market participants for the 
future (Clayton, Ling and Naranjo, 2009). For office, industrial and retail, current investment 
conditions are reported for more than one segment (e.g. office CBD and office suburban). As a 
consequence, we use principal components analysis (oblimin rotation) to extract a common 
factor or score for each property type with more than one segment. In particular, we retain the 
eigenvector with the highest eigenvalue (principal component), which is able to explain the 
largest variance in the respective data. For diversified REITs, we use a common factor derived 
from the investment conditions for all property types as sentiment measure. Our approach 
follows Ling, Naranjo and Scheick (2013). We then match the respective RERC sentiment score 
to REITs based on property type, e.g. we use the RERC retail sentiment score for REITs 
specializing in retail.  
 
Institutional Investor Trading in REITs 
We measure institutional investor trading behavior in the REIT market as buy-sell imbalance 
(BSI) in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). This measure has also been used as a proxy for 
investor sentiment. In our analysis, we focus on publicly traded US equity REITs specializing in 
office, industrial, apartment, retail and hotel as well as diversified REITs. This focus stems from 
the availability of RERC sentiment measures for these property types. We also only include 
REITs traded on the NYSE in our sample, as institutional investors prefer firms listed at this 
exchange (Below, Stansell and Coffin, 2000). We define BSI as follows:      
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BSIt =
(Bt - St )
(Bt + St )
     (1) 
Where  Bt (St) is the quarterly long (short) position of institutional investors in a particular REIT. 
The BSI measure indicates whether institutional investors are net buyers (BSIt > 0) or net sellers 
(BSIt < 0) of shares of a particular REIT. A BSI of 1 (-1) for a particular REIT suggests that 
institutional investors only purchased (sold) this REIT’s shares in a particular quarter.  A BSI of 
less that 1 or more than -1 indicates that institutional investors varied in their investment and 
divestment in shares of a particular REIT, i.e. some investors purchased stocks while others sold 
them in the same quarter.  
To calculate the institutional investor BSI, we obtain information about institutional 
trading of individual REITs from the Institutional (13f) Holdings database (s34) in Thomson 
Reuters for the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. Institutional investors covered by this dataset are 
pension funds, banks, insurance companies, parent companies of mutual funds and other 
institutions such as endowment funds. For each quarter, we derive the aggregated net change in 
the holdings of a particular REIT by institutional investors (Bt-St) and aggregated total 
institutional investor trading volume of that REIT (aggregated absolute net change; Bt+St).  
One shortcoming of the Thomson Reuters 13f data for our investigation is that it 
combines institutions invested in the unsecuritized and securitized market (pension funds, banks, 
insurance companies) with institutions that do not directly invest in real estate (mutual funds), 
but heavily invest in REITs (Devos et al., 2013). To control for the REIT trading of mutual 
funds, we derive a mutual fund BSI based on Equation 1 and data from the Mutual Fund 
Holdings database (s12) in Thomson Reuters. While the Institutional (13f) Holdings database 
includes aggregated mutual fund trading at the parent company level, the Mutual Fund Holdings 
 
12 
database includes disaggregated trading by individual mutual funds. As the BSI measures are 
based on aggregated trading activity, these differences are irrelevant to our empirical analysis.  
 
Liquidity Control Measures  
Clayton and MacKinnon (2003a) find that investor sentiment is important to REIT pricing even 
after accounting for REIT and private market liquidity. Additionally, an extensive body of 
literature provides evidence for the importance of liquidity to asset pricing in the stock market 
(Liu, 2006; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Amihud, 2002; Amihud 
and Mendelson, 1986). In our empirical analysis, we control for the liquidity of individual REIT 
stocks and REIT market by using the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure as shown in Equation 2. 
We also employ a modified Amihud (2002) measure to control for private market illiquidity. 
This modified measure allows the computation of the Amihud (2002) measure for private real 
estate, where information on daily pricing at index level is not available: 
              (2) 
Where ILLIQ is the illiquidity of a REIT stock or property type i in period y, R is the absolute 
return and VOL the trading volume. To calculate the illiquidity measure for different commercial 
property markets from Q1/2002 to Q2/2012, we obtain the quarterly property type-specific 
NCREIF transaction based index (NTBI) total return (in absolute terms) and divide it by the 
dollar-denominated trading volume, defined as quarterly property type-specific aggregate sale 
price.  
We calculate individual stock and market illiquidity measures for REITs traded by 
institutional investors over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012 based on the Institutional (13f) 
Holdings database (s34) in Thomson Reuters. We obtain information about quarterly REIT 
ILLIQiy =
| Riy |
VOLiy
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returns and total trading volume from CRSP and derive the REIT-level illiquidity measure based 
on Equation 2. The REIT market illiquidity measure represents a value-weighted (by market 
capitalization) quarterly aggregate of the REIT-level illiquidity values. In our analysis of the 
impact of institutional real estate investor sentiment on REIT pricing, we control for REIT-level 
illiquidity by using the mean-adjusted Amihud (2002) measure. The mean adjustment addresses 
variation in average market illiquidity over time and is derived by dividing the illiquidity 
measure for an individual stock by the respective market illiquidity measure (Amihud, 2002). 
 
Other Control Variables 
Finally, to control for the impact of other fundamentals on institutional REIT trading behavior, 
we include economic and capital market fundamentals in our model. At the macro-economic 
level, we control for unemployment (UNP) by including the average quarterly unemployment 
rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). This variable, which is negatively related to 
gross domestic product (GDP; Knotek, 2007), proxies for demand for space which in turn affects 
real estate prices (Brooks and Tsolacos, 1999). It has also been used as a proxy for the general 
state of the economy in previous studies (Bianchi and Guidolin, 2014; Fei et al., 2010). In our 
analysis, we substituted unemployment with GDP, and results were qualitatively similar. As a 
consequence, we only report our results with the unemployment control variable.  
At capital market level, we control for debt capital market conditions by including the 
term structure (Clayton, Ling and Naranjo, 2009) and the default risk premium/credit spread. The 
term structure (TRM) is defined as the difference between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond 
and 3-month treasury bill (Clayton, Ling and Naranjo, 2009). The default risk premium (SPR) is 
defined as difference between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. To 
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control for the general stock market, we also include the return on the S&P500 composite index 
from CRSP (SNP).  
As the REIT industry matured and market capitalization increased, a number of REITs 
have been added to Standard & Poor stock market indices such as the S&P400, 500 or 600. 
These stocks represent the preferred habitat of institutional investors, as they are larger, older and 
less volatile. To control for systematic differences between REITs included in S&P indices and 
those that are not, we introduce a binary variable coded 1 for quarters in which a REIT was 
included in an index (SPINDEX). Lastly, we control for the level of institutional ownership in a 
REIT. The effect of institutional real estate investor sentiment on trading behavior may be 
systematically different for stocks with different levels of institutional and individual investor 
ownership. As a consequence, we obtain the total institutional ownership as a percentage of 
shares outstanding from Thomson Reuters and include INSTOWN in our analysis. In our sample 
241 observations have an institutional ownership greater than 100%, which is a well-documented 
issue of this database (Glushkov, Moussawi and Palacios, 2009). We drop these observations 
from our sample. 
An overview of our variables, their definitions, computations and data sources is 
provided in Table A1 in the Appendix. Our panel dataset covers 2,357 REIT quarters for 68 
REITs over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. Summary statistics for all variables are presented 
in Table 1 for the full sample and Table A2 in Appendix by period (2002-06, 2007-09 and 2010-
12). The measures for REIT and mutual fund trading behavior, BSIINST and BSIMF respectively, 
suggest, on average, a net buying behavior for both type of investors over our sample period, 
with mutual funds showing a more pronounced net buyer attitude than institutions also invested 
in the unsecuritized market. The different average illiquidity measures (AMILLIQMARKET and 
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AMILLIQCOM) are similar if we exclude the one referring to individual REITs (AMILLIQREIT), 
where a higher value can be expected. On average 40% of the REITs in our sample are included 
in S&P indexes, while the average institutional ownership is around 71%. If we then turn to the 
risk/return factors of the asset pricing model, we find that REITs and the equity market have 
respectively performed on average 3.90% and 1.27% per quarter, while the three other factors of 
the Cahart (1997) model show positive factor loadings on average. 
 
 [Insert Table 1 here] 
 
Panel A in Table 2 presents pairwise correlations between the sentiment, liquidity and return 
variables. Institutional investor sentiment in the commercial real estate market (RERCSENT) and 
their trading behavior in the REIT market (BSIINST) are significantly negatively correlated. To 
further assess the relationship between these two variables over time, we determine the pairwise 
correlations between RERCSENT and BSIINST for the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period, which 
are presented in Panel B in Table 2. While the correlation coefficients are negative yet 
insignificant during the pre- and post-crisis, the two variables have a significantly negative 
correlation during the financial crisis (2007-2009). Thus, the more pessimistic institutional 
investors were about the private real estate market, the more did they behave like net buyers in 
the REIT market. Panel B suggests that the significantly negative correlation between the two 
variables in Panel A is primarily driven by the crisis period. Overall, the significantly negative 
correlation of RERCSENT and BSIINST in Table 2 provides initial evidence for the flight to liquidity 
theory, at least during the financial crisis.  
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The relationship of BSIINST and RERCSENT over time is also graphically depicted in Figure 1, 
which clearly shows the significantly negative correlation between the two variables during the 
crisis years, particularly from the second quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2009.  
Interestingly, Figure 1 shows a noticeable drop in the BSIINST measure, i.e. a net selling behavior 
of institutional investors, between the second quarter of 2006 and the first quarter of 2007. This 
may be related to a number of factors such as the end of the housing boom, stock market 
conditions at this particular time or a preference of institutional investors for certain types of 
unsecuritized real estate such as multi-family housing over REIT stocks, as the institutional 
investor sentiment in the commercial real estate market (RERCSENT) was relatively high in this 
period.  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
As shown in Panel A in Table 2, the trading behavior of institutional investors in the REIT 
market (BSIINST) is significantly positively correlated with the trading behavior of mutual funds 
(BSIMF), the illiquidity of a particular REIT (AMILLIQREIT), the REIT market (AMILLIQMARKET) 
and the commercial real estate market (AMILLIQCOM). An increase in commercial real estate 
illiquidity increases the net buying behavior in the REIT market, which provides evidence for a 
fundamentals-driven flight to liquidity. Additionally, the increase in institutional trading if REIT 
market and individual REIT illiquidity are high appears to be in line with the findings of Devos 
et al. (2013) that institutional investors moved towards REITs with higher turnover (liquidity) 
during times of economic crisis. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
 
 
17 
Methodology 
To investigate whether the flight to liquidity or style investing theory has the highest explanatory 
power for the effect of institutional real estate investor sentiment in the unsecuritized real estate 
market on REIT trading behavior, we first conduct diagnostic tests to identify unit roots and 
transform non-stationary variables to remove them. We then employ a linear regression model to 
our unbalanced panel dataset, and regress BSIINST on RERC sentiment, illiquidity and control 
variables as shown in Equation 3. In our linear regression, we control for firm-fixed effects. 
 
BSIINSTi,t =a i + b1RERCSENT + b2AMMILIQREITi,t + b3AMILLIQMARKETt +
b4AMILLIQCOMt + b5BSIMFi,t + b6INSTOWNi,t + b7SPINDEXi,t + b8X + ei,t
                     (3) 
 
Where BSIINST is the buy sell index for institutional investors in REITs in line with Kumar and 
Lee (2006), i indexes firms and t indexes time (in quarters), αi is the intercept, which controls for 
firm fixed effects, and ε is the error term. RERCSENT is the institutional investor sentiment in the 
commercial real estate market. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud 
(2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real 
estate market respectively. BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in REITs. 
INSTOWN is the percentage of institutional ownership in a REIT. SPINDEX is a binary variable 
coded 1 for quarters in which a REIT was included in an S&P index. X is a vector of economic 
and capital market control variables (SPR, TRM, UNP and SNP). 
Furthermore, to assess the impact of institutional real estate investor sentiment on REIT 
returns, we regress the quarterly REIT returns on RERCSENT, the four systematic risk factors, the 
mean adjusted Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure and the lags of REIT returns and RERCSENT as 
shown in Equation 4. 
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RETREITi,t =a + b1RERCSENT + b2MKT + b3SMB + b4HML + b5MOM +
b6AMILLIQMA + b7lagRETREIT + b8lagRERCSENT + ei,t
                  (4)           
 
Where RETREIT are quarterly REIT returns, i indexes firms and t indexes time (in quarters), 
RERCSENT is the institutional investor sentiment in the commercial real estate market, MKT, 
SMB, HML and MOM are systematic risk factors in line with Fama and French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997). AMILLIQMA is the mean adjusted Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure. 
LagRETREIT and lagRERCSENT are lags of the respective variables.  
 
Results  
Institutional Investor Sentiment and Trading Behavior In Securitized Markets 
Table 3 presents the results for our analysis of the relationship of institutional real estate investor 
sentiment (RERCSENT) and REIT trading behavior (BSIINST). In our estimation using the full 
sample (Overall Sample column), the coefficient on RERCSENT is positive, yet insignificant. 
However, this initial aggregated analysis fails to distinguish between different investor habitats 
and time periods, which may explain the insignificant coefficient. To assess sentiment-induced 
institutional trading in the securitized real estate market further, we conduct the following 
disaggregated analyses.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
Previous studies have shown that institutional investors prefer larger and older stocks (Devos et 
al., 2013; Below, Stansell and Coffin, 2000; Graff and Young, 1997), which can be considered 
the habitat of institutional investors. Clayton and MacKinnon (2003b) provide further support for 
an institutional investor habitat characterized by large cap REITs. Consequently, we investigate 
the relationship of RERCSENT and BSIINST for stocks that form the institutional and individual 
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investor habitat. We define the institutional investor habitat as securities (i.e. REITs) included in 
S&P indices (i.e. larger and older REITs) and REITs with high (above median) institutional 
ownership. On the other hand, securities in the individual investor habitat are characterized as 
stocks not included in S&P indices (i.e. small and medium cap REITs) and with low (below 
median) institutional ownership. We then estimate our model as shown in Equation 3 for each of 
the different investor habitats.  
The results of our analysis disaggregated by investor habitat are presented in Table 3. 
Except for securities with low institutional ownership, the coefficients on RERCSENT are 
insignificant for S&P Index, non-S&P index and high institutional ownership REITs. These 
initial results suggest that the irrational sentiment of institutional investors in the unsecuritized 
market has no effect on their trading behavior in the securitized market within the institutional 
habitat. The positive coefficient for stocks with low institutional ownership provides initial 
support for style investing. An increase in optimism (pessimism) about the commercial real 
estate market increased the buying (selling) behavior of institutional investors in low institutional 
ownership stocks. In other words institutional investors may have decided to increase the 
exposure to securitized assets with low institutional ownership to obtain more investment 
opportunities and pre-empt the action of individual investors to gain profits. However, we further 
disaggregate our analysis by time period and property type to assess the robustness of these 
results, and discuss them in the remainder of this paper. 
The coefficients on the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures of individual REITs 
(AMILLIQREIT), overall public market (AMILLIQMARKET) and private market (AMILLIQCOM) are 
insignificant across all samples in Table 3. The trading behavior of mutual funds (BSIMF) has a 
positive relationship with that of institutional real estate investors (BSIINST). It is beyond the 
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scope of this study to investigate how the trading behaviors of different types of institutional 
investors are related. However, one explanation for this consistently positive and significant 
relationship is herding among different institutional investors, i.e. mutual funds, pension funds, 
investment managers and insurance companies. The coefficients on the macro-economic 
variables such as credit risk spread (SPR), term structure (TRM), unemployment (UNP) and 
S&P500 returns (SNP) are consistent with expectations about their direction, but vary in 
significance.  
Devos et al. (2013) show that the preferences of institutional REIT investors have 
changed over time, particularly around the most recent financial crisis. As a consequence, we 
estimate our model for the pre-crisis (2002-2006), financial crisis (2007-2009) and post-crisis 
(2010-2012) period. To identify the financial crisis period (2007 to 2009), we follow Devos et al. 
(2013).  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 4 presents the results for the overall sample separated by time periods. In the pre-crisis 
years, the coefficient on RERCSENT is significantly positive at the 1% level, and this provides 
evidence for a style investing of institutional investors in the real estate category. If institutional 
investors were irrationally optimistic (pessimistic) about the underlying private market, they 
behaved like net buyers (sellers) in the securitized market. However, during the crisis period, the 
relationship between RERCSENT and BSIINST changed from positive to negative, as shown by the 
significantly negative coefficient on RERCSENT. Thus, the more pessimistic institutional investors 
were about the unsecuritized market, the higher was the amount of securitized real estate assets 
they purchased, with this result supporting the flight to liquidity theory. In the post-crisis period 
from 2010 to 2012, institutional investor sentiment in the private market had a significantly 
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negative effect on the institutional trading behavior in securitized markets (i.e. REITs). This 
result suggests a fundamental change in institutional preferences from the pre- to the post-crisis 
period due to the financial crisis, in line with Devos et al. (2013).  
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Next we contrast stocks forming the institutional investor habitat (included in the S&P index) 
with those in the individual investor habitat (not included in the S&P index) over different time 
periods. Results are presented in Table 5. The significantly positive coefficients on RERCSENT for 
the period of 2002 to 2006 provide further support for a style investing of institutional investors 
in the real estate category, when markets were booming. Interestingly, the coefficient on 
RERCSENT is positive and significant at the 5% and 1% level respectively for S&P and non-S&P 
REITs. These findings for the pre-crisis period are in line with our previous findings for the 
overall sample in Table 4, suggesting that the style investing theory has the highest explanatory 
power for the sentiment-induced institutional trading behavior in the securitized market in this 
time period, irrespective of whether securities belong to the individual or institutional investor 
habitat.   
For the financial crisis period of 2007 to 2009, instead, the coefficient on RERCSENT again 
changes direction and becomes significantly negative at the 1% for S&P and non-S&P REITs, 
which supports our previous findings for the full sample (Table 4). The more pessimistic 
institutional investors were about the unsecuritized real estate market, the more they behaved as 
net buyers in the securitized real estate market. These results suggest a sentiment-induced capital 
switching between the illiquid private and more liquid public real estate market, irrespective of 
habitat, in line with the flight to liquidity theory. Our results mirror the ones of Devos et al. 
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(2013), who show that some institutional investors such as banks significantly increased their 
REIT ownership during the financial crisis.  
For the post-crisis period of 2010 to 2012, the coefficient on RERCSENT is negative yet 
insignificant for stocks included in the S&P500 index and significantly negative at the 5% level 
for non-S&P500 stocks. The financial crisis has hence changed the relationship of RERCSENT and 
BSIINST from positive (category theory) to negative (flight to liquidity), probably due to a higher 
risk perception of investors with regard to unsecuritized real estate markets despite the mild 
recovery subsequent to the financial crisis. Our results are in line with previous findings of 
Devos et al. (2013) that the investment behavior and preferences of institutional REIT investors 
changed with economic conditions. Devos et al. (2013) find that institutional investors placed a 
greater emphasis on managing risk following the crisis. In particular, the authors show that 
insurance companies and banks have become more conservative after the crisis. Our findings 
suggest that this emphasis on lower risk exposure also holds for the relationship of unsecuritized 
and securitized market investments, and led institutional investors to switch capital between 
these two markets based on perceived risk levels in the crisis and post-crisis period.  
The results of our time-period specific analysis for the full sample in Table 4 as well as 
S&P and non-S&P REITs in Table 5 indicate that the initial aggregated analysis in Table 3 
masks differences in the relationship of RERCSENT and BSIINST over time. The insignificant 
coefficients on RERCSENT for S&P, non-S&P and high institutional ownership REITs in Table 3 
are likely the result of directional changes in the investigated relationship over time, due to style 
investing in positive economic conditions (2002 to 2006) and a flight to liquidity in difficult 
economic environments (2007 to 2009).  
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To assess the robustness of our findings, we conduct two robustness checks. First, we estimate 
our model as shown in Equation 3 for portfolios of REITs with above median (high) and below 
median (low) institutional ownership, which represents an alternative proxy for the habitat of 
institutional and individual investors. Our results are presented in Table 6. The coefficients on 
RERCSENT for both types of REITs are significantly positive in the pre-crisis period (2002 to 
2006), significantly negative in the crisis period (2007 to 2009) and negative, but insignificant in 
the post-crisis period (2010 to 2012). These results suggest that our main findings are robust to 
different definitions of individual and institutional investor habitat. Institutional investors style 
invested in the pre-crisis period and showed a flight to liquidity in the crisis period and to a lesser 
extent in the post-crisis period.  
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
As a second robustness check, we estimate our model for different property types in all three 
periods. As shown in Table 7, the coefficients on RERCSENT are consistent across asset types, 
although varying in significance. In particular, coefficients are significantly positive in the pre-
crisis period for industrial, retail and hotel REITs, but insignificant for office REITs. 
Interestingly, the coefficient on RERCSENT for multi-family REITs is significantly negative in the 
pre-crisis period. During the crisis period, institutional investor sentiment in the private market is 
significantly negatively related to institutional trading of REITs of all property type 
specializations, except hotel. While the coefficient for hotel REITs is in the expected direction, 
the insignificance may stem from low statistical power due to a relatively small sample size. 
Last, while the coefficients on RERCSENT for all property type specializations in the post-crisis 
period are negative, only the one for hotel REITs is significant. Overall, the results for different 
property types support our previous findings. The applicability of style investing and flight to 
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liquidity theory depends on economic conditions: in pre-crisis conditions style investing best 
explains sentiment-induced institutional trading behavior in the securitized real market, while in 
crisis and to some extent in the post-crisis conditions the flight to liquidity theory is more 
suitable.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
Institutional Investor Sentiment and Securitized Asset Pricing 
Table 8 presents the results for the effect of institutional investor sentiment in the unsecuritized 
market on asset pricing in the securitized market. For the overall sample, institutional investor 
sentiment in the commercial real estate market has a significantly positive effect on REIT 
returns. For the pre-crisis period of 2002 to 2006, RERCSENT also has a significantly positive 
effect on the returns of REITs in the individual and institutional investor habitat. This is in line 
with the significantly positive correlation between institutional investor sentiment in the private 
real estate market and REIT returns identified by Ling, Naranjo and Scheick (2013). The 
sentiment-induced trading behavior of institutional investors in the securitized real estate market 
identified previously introduces additional systematic risk into asset pricing in line with previous 
studies (Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003). While the effect of 
institutional investor sentiment on the returns of large cap REITs (institutional investor habitat) 
is in line with earlier studies (Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003b; Graff and Young, 1997), we also 
find an impact on the returns of REITs in the individual investor habitat. This effect can be 
explained with the presence of fewer fundamental traders and greater limits to arbitrage in this 
habitat. An additional explanation for the impact of institutional sentiment on the return of 
REITs in the individual investor habitat is that institutional trading signals information to less 
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informed individual investors. Lee, Lee and Chiang (2008) argue that individual investors use 
institutional investors as a source of information, and follow them in and out of small cap REITs 
based on private market performance. As individual investors are less likely to be able to 
determine whether institutional trading is based on private market fundamentals (e.g. 
performance) or irrational sentiment, they also likely follow institutional investors in and out of 
REITs in their habitat based on sentiment.   
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In the crisis (2007 to 2009), RERCSENT has a positive yet insignificant coefficient for the S&P 
REIT sample and a significantly positive coefficient for non-S&P REITs. The insignificant 
coefficient for the crisis period is puzzling. One explanation for the non-existing effect of 
commercial investor sentiment on the pricing of S&P REITs between 2007 and 2009 may be that 
factors such as the flight to quality (Devos et al., 2013) have increased the presence of 
fundamentals traders in these larger, older and relatively more liquid stocks. These investors in 
turn may face lower limits to arbitrage in these REITs and be able to arbitrage away the 
additional sentiment-induced risk. On the other hand, arbitrage may be too costly in REITs 
forming the habitat of individual investors (Kumar and Lee, 2006), and this explains the 
persistent effect of private market sentiment on securitized returns.  
The significantly positive coefficient on RERCSENT for non-S&P REITs is also somewhat 
counter-intuitive. With regards to our previous findings for BSIINST, if institutional investors as a 
group are pessimistic about the private market during the financial crisis, and switch their 
investments from private to public real estate, we expect a negative coefficient. This aggregated 
trading behavior (flight to liquidity) should increase the systematic risk in REITs, when 
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institutional investors are pessimistic, and consequently increase returns to compensate for this 
additional risk. 
Commercial real estate sentiment has a significantly positive effect on institutional 
trading behavior for S&P REITs, but no effect for non-S&P REITs in the post-crisis period. 
Analogously to the crisis period, these effects are somewhat counter-intuitive, particularly with 
regard to our findings for BSIINST in Table 5. Overall, our results for the crisis and post-crisis 
period suggest that further investigations into the relationship of commercial real estate 
sentiment and REIT returns, particularly across different investor habitats and for these time 
periods, are needed.  
 
Conclusion 
Our study yields a number of interesting results. First, we show that the sentiment of institutional 
investors in the underlying unsecuritized real estate market affects their trading behavior in the 
securitized market, suggesting a spillover effect of irrational sentiment between private and 
public market. Moreover, our findings suggest that the direction of sentiment-induced trading 
behavior of institutional investors in the securitized market depends on economic conditions, 
particularly with regard to the most recent financial crisis (2007 to 2009).  
During times of favorable economic and property market conditions such as 2002 to 2006 
(pre-crisis), institutions style invested in the real estate category based on their sentiment about 
the underlying private market. If institutional investors as a group felt irrationally optimistic 
(pessimistic) about commercial real estate, they would have increased (decreased) their 
investment in the real estate category, including both securitized and unsecuritized assets. Our 
study complements the extensive literature on style (category) investing theory (Choi and Sias, 
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2009; Froot and Teo, 2008; Barberis, Shleifer and Wurgler, 2005; Barberis and Shleifer, 2003) 
by providing empirical evidence that institutional investors not only style-invest within the stock 
market, but also across asset markets (e.g. the unsecuritized and securitized real estate market). 
Our findings also contribute to the institutional herding literature (Sias 2004; Nofsinger and Sias, 
1999) by showing that institutional investors as a group herd in and out of asset categories, 
increasing volatility and introducing a non-fundamental component into asset pricing. This is in 
line with the institutional herding effects found in Clayton and MacKinnon (2003b) and Graff 
and Young (1997). 
Our finding that institutions style-invest in the real estate category based on sentiment 
represents a behavioral explanation for the comovement of securitized and unsecuritized real 
estate returns (Pagliari et al., 2005; Myer and Webb, 1993; Giliberto, 1990). Lee, Lee and 
Chiang (2008) find that sentiment linked to private markets has a high explanatory power for 
large cap securities (i.e. REITs) for the period of 1993 to 2003. The authors explain this finding 
with an increased involvement of institutions invested in both markets that strengthen the link 
between private market fundamentals and public asset returns. Our findings for the pre-crisis 
period support Lee, Lee and Chiang (2008).  
For the crisis period, we find evidence of sentiment-induced capital switching between 
the illiquid unsecuritized real estate market and the more liquid securitized one. As institutional 
investors are highly sensitive to the illiquidity risk in commercial real estate (Dhar and 
Goetzmann, 2006), and have a preference for more liquid real estate investments such as REITs 
(Ciochetti, Craft and Shilling, 2002), we control for private and public market illiquidity to 
ensure that our results are not driven by fundamental illiquidity risk. Thus, our sentiment 
measure (RERCSENT) captures perceived (sentiment-based) risk in the private real estate market, 
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as opposed to fundamentals-based liquidity risk. Our findings for the crisis period complement 
previous findings by Devos et al. (2013). While the earlier study showed a flight to quality of 
institutional investors within the REIT market, our study finds a flight to liquidity of institutional 
investors between the unsecuritized and securitized real estate market. Furthermore, we provide a 
behavioral explanation for the capital switching between real estate markets as discussed by Lee, 
Lee and Chiang (2008). In addition, our study also contributes to the flight to liquidity / quality 
literature (e.g. Baker and Wurgler, 2012; Brunnermeier and Pederson, 2009; Goyenko and 
Ukhov, 2009; Connolly, Stivers and Sun, 2007; Archarya and Pederson, 2005) by showing that a 
flight to liquidity not only occurs within the stock market or between bond & stock market, but 
also between unsecuritized and securitized markets of the same asset (e.g. direct investment in 
real estate and REITs).  
Overall, our findings suggest that the style investing and flight to liquidity theory are 
complementary rather than substitute theories for the sentiment-induced trading behavior of 
institutional investors in the REIT market. Our results hold across different groups of securities 
(e.g. REITs with high and low institutional ownership, included or not in the S&P index) and 
property types. Our study provides additional evidence that the financial crisis has changed the 
preferences of institutional investors towards financial assets that imply a lower risk exposure 
(Devos et al. 2013). Future studies with larger post-crisis datasets may investigate whether this 
effect is temporary or persistent, as well as implications for institutional portfolio performance. 
Last, our investigation into the effect of institutional investor sentiment on securitized 
real estate pricing suggests that not only the sentiment of individual investors positively affects 
REIT returns (Lin et al., 2009; Chiang and Lee, 2009; Clayton and MacKinnon, 2003a; Barkham 
and Ward, 1999), but also institutional investor sentiment in the underlying private market. 
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Our results have implications for future studies on investor sentiment in general and institutional 
investors in particular. First, institutional investors cannot be assumed to be rational, and future 
studies on investor sentiment in securitized or unsecuritized real estate markets need to account 
for both institutional and individual investor sentiment. Additionally, our findings suggest that 
investor sentiment studies should be time variant, and distinguish between different time periods 
as risk perception and investment behavior change over time. We consider our study a starting 
point for future investigations into institutional investor sentiment, the sentiment-driven trading 
behavior of institutional investors between private and public market as well as the effect of 
liquidity on investor sentiment.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Sentiment measures 
 Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
RERCSENT 1.19 0.62 3.15 -6.57 7.5 
BSIINST 0.16 0.23 0.46 -1.00 1 
BSIMF 0.49 0.53 0.32 -0.93 1 
 
Panel B: Illiquidity and Liquidity Measures 
AMILLIQREIT 0.10 0.03 0.29 0.00 5.05 
AMILLIQMARKET 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.07 
AMILLIQCOM 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.10 
 
Panel C: Fundamentals 
SPR 4.52 5.08 1.81  1.29 7.85 
TRM 2.02 2.41 1.19 -0.41 3.44 
UNP 6.65 5.83 1.92  4.43 9.93 
SNP 0.30 0.55 2.94 -7.88 4.91 
SPINDEX 0.40 0.00 0.49  0.00 1.00 
INSTOWN 71.22 77.71 22.38  0.09 100 
 
Panel D: REIT Returns and Systematic Risk Factors 
RETREIT 3.90 4.95 18.46 -145.84 203.17 
MKT 1.27 1.55 9.02 -22.28 16.55 
SMB 1.21 0.74 4.04 -6.03 12.01 
HML 0.87 0.80 6.62 -13.63 23.85 
MOM 0.08 0.45 3.32 -13.97 5.75 
 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for a sample of 2,357 REIT quarters (68 REITs) over the 
period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological 
commercial real estate markets and is based on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the 
period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell index for institutional investors in individual REITs in line 
with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. 
AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual 
REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real estate market respectively. SPR is the default risk premium 
(spread) defined as difference between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. TRM is the 
term structure defined as difference between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond and 3-month treasury bill. 
UNP is the unemployment rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. SPINDEX is coded 1 for quarters in 
which a REIT is included in the S&P 400, 500 or 600 index. INSTOWN is the percentage of institutional 
ownership in a REIT. RETREIT is the quarterly return for a particular REIT. MKT, SMB, HML and MOM are 
systematic risk factors. 
  
 
37 
Table 2: Correlations 
 
Panel A: Correlations of Sentiment Measures, Liquidity Measures and REIT Returns 
 RERCSENT BSIINST BSIMF AMILLIQREIT AMILLIQMARKET AMILLIQCOM RETREIT 
RERCSENT  1       
BSIINST -0.06*** 1      
BSIMF  0.01 0.15***  1     
AMILLIQREIT -0.05** 0.10***  0.02  1    
AMILLIQMARKET -0.12*** 0.21***  0.08***  0.22***   1   
AMILLIQCOM -0.21*** 0.09*** -0.07***  0.04* -0.03  1  
RETREIT  0.08*** 0.08***  0.05** -0.01 -0.08***  0.19*** 1 
        
Panel B: Correlations of Commercial Real Estate Investor Sentiment and REIT Trading Behavior Over Time 
   BSIINST  
2002 - 2006 RERCSENT -0.03  
2007 - 2009 RERCSENT -0.24***  
2010 - 2012 RERCSENT -0.04  
 
Note: RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological commercial real estate markets and is based on the 
“investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell index for institutional 
investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. 
AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the 
commercial real estate market respectively. RETREIT is the quarterly return for a particular REIT. 
 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 3: Results for Institutional Investor Trading Behavior in REITs 
(BSIINST) 
 
 Overall 
Sample 
S&P 
Index 
Non-S&P 
Index 
Institutional Ownership 
High  Low 
RERCSENT  0.01  0.00  0.00 -0.01  0.02* 
AMILLIQREIT  0.01 -0.09  0.01 -0.07  0.01 
AMILLIQMARKET -0.20  1.96 -0.53  0.48  0.04 
AMILLIQCOM  0.68  1.20  0.67  1.29  0.06 
BSIMF  0.14***  0.12***  0.13***  0.13***  0.12*** 
INSTOWN  0.00*  0.01***  0.00  0.00***  0.00** 
SPINDEX  0.02    0.03  0.01 
SPR -0.03 -0.04* -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 
TRM  0.28***  0.28***  0.30***  0.29***  0.28*** 
UNP -0.03*** -0.02* -0.03** -0.03** -0.03 
SNP  0.01***  0.00  0.01***  0.01*  0.01** 
Constant -0.29*** -0.62*** -0.21** -0.56*** -0.26** 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.33 0.23 
N (n) 2357 (68) 933 (44) 1424 (64) 1562 (60) 795 (51) 
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of BSIINST on the following variables using 
firm-fixed effects linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are reported for the overall sample, 
REITs that are included in a S&P index (S&P) and those that are not (Non-S&P), REITs with above 
median and below median institutional ownership. RERCSENT measures institutional investor 
sentiment in different typological commercial real estate markets and is based on the “investment 
conditions” item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell 
index for institutional investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the 
buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and 
AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and 
the commercial real estate market respectively. SPR is the default risk premium (spread) defined as 
difference between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. TRM is the term 
structure defined as difference between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond and 3-month treasury 
bill. UNP is the unemployment rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. INSTOWN is the 
percentage of institutional ownership in a REIT. SPINDEX is a binary variable coded 1 for quarters 
in which a REIT was included in an S&P index. The reported R2 is the overall R2 resulting from the 
respective within and between R2s. 
 
 ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 4: Results for Institutional Investor Trading Behavior in REITs 
(BSIINST) for the Overall Sample Separated by Time 
 
 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
RERCSENT  0.08*** -0.10*** -0.03* 
AMILLIQREIT -0.01 -0.06  0.08 
AMILLIQMARKET  3.51**  4.40** 12.50** 
AMILLIQCOM 13.86***  0.05 -1.17 
BSIMF  0.10***  0.19***  0.13*** 
INSTOWN -0.00  0.01***  0.00 
SPINDEX -0.04  0.08  0.04 
SPR -0.42*** -0.01  0.01 
TRM  0.22***  0.29***  0.11 
UNP  1.44*** -0.18***  0.07 
SNP -0.03***  0.06***  0.00 
Constant -6.60*** -0.09 -0.99 
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.43 0.15 0.06 
N (n) 1112 (63) 638 (63) 607 (68) 
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of BSIINST on the following variables using 
firm-fixed effects linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are reported for the overall 
sample for pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2012) period. 
RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological commercial real 
estate markets and is based on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the 
period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell index for institutional investors in individual 
REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in 
individual REITs. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) 
illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real estate market 
respectively. SPR is the default risk premium (spread) defined as difference between yield of BAA 
rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. TRM is the term structure defined as difference 
between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond and 3-month treasury bill. UNP is the 
unemployment rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. INSTOWN is the percentage of 
institutional ownership in a REIT. SPINDEX is a binary variable coded 1 for quarters in which a 
REIT was included in an S&P index. The reported R2 is the overall R2 resulting from the 
respective within and between R2s. 
 
 ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 5: Results for BSIINST Separated for S&P and Non-S&P REITs and Time Period 
 
 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
 S&P Non-S&P S&P Non-S&P S&P Non-S&P 
RERCSENT  0.09**  0.08*** -0.08*** -0.13*** -0.03  -0.06** 
AMILLIQREIT  0.32 -0.00  0.03 -0.02  0.32   0.00 
AMILLIQMARKET  2.54  3.69**  2.68  5.37 19.11*** -1.35  
AMILLIQCOM 12.12* 14.59***  0.89 -0.52  -1.81* -0.74 
BSIMF  0.12  0.10**  0.10   0.24***  0.14***  0.16*** 
INSTOWN -0.01* -0.00  0.02***  0.00  0.01*** -0.00  
SPR -0.48*** -0.39***  0.02 -0.06 -0.04 -0.06 
TRM  0.26***  0.21***  0.20***  0.37***  0.13  0.16 
UNP  1.47***  1.41*** -0.13*** -0.22***  0.14* -0.03 
SNP -0.01 -0.03***  0.04***  0.07*** -0.00   0.00 
Constant -6.27*** -6.56*** -0.89**  0.53  -1.87*  0.58 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.43 0.40 0.13 0.18 0.07 0.03 
N (n) 243 (21) 869 (59) 328 (35) 310 (41) 362 (44) 245 (30) 
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of BSIINST on the following variables using fixed effects 
linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are reported for REITs that are in an S&P index and those that 
are not for the pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2012) period. RERCSENT 
measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological commercial real estate markets and is based 
on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the 
buy sell index for institutional investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the 
buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM 
are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real 
estate market respectively. INSTOWN is the percentage of institutional ownership in a REIT. SPR is the default 
risk premium (spread) defined as difference between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. 
TRM is the term structure defined as difference between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond and 3-month 
treasury bill. UNP is the unemployment rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. The reported R2 is the 
overall R2 resulting from the respective within and between R2s. 
 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 6: Results for BSIINST Separated for High and Low Institutional Ownership REITs 
and Time Period 
 
 2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
 High Low High Low High  Low 
RERCSENT  0.08***  0.08*** -0.10*** -0.13*** -0.03 -0.02 
AMILLIQREIT  0.48 -0.06 -0.11  0.01 -0.17  0.21 
AMILLIQMARKET  2.59  4.80**  3.61  7.35* 12.75** -10.70 
AMILLIQCOM 17.70*** 10.13**  0.23  0.76 -0.17 -0.41 
BSIMF  0.08  0.11**  0.16**  0.21*  0.13***  0.14* 
INSTOWN  0.00  0.00  0.01***  0.03***  0.01***  0.00 
SPINDEX -0.02 -0.07  0.10  0.16  0.06  0.17 
SPR -0.48*** -0.31***  0.02 -0.11 -0.01 -1.09 
TRM  0.23***  0.21***  0.25***  0.33***  0.11  0.83* 
UNP  1.66***  1.10*** -0.17*** -0.19***  0.11  0.01 
SNP -0.03*** -0.02**  0.06***  0.06*** -0.00  0.03** 
Constant -7.81*** -5.38*** -0.34 -0.58*** -1.92  4.03 
Firm-fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.47 0.28 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.18 
N (n) 620 (49) 492 (45) 463 (54) 175 (24) 479 (60) 128 (29) 
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of BSIINST on the following variables using fixed effects 
linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are reported for REITs with above median and below median 
institutional ownership for the pre-crisis (2002-2006), crisis (2007-2009) and post-crisis (2010-2012) period. 
RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological commercial real estate markets and 
is based on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST 
is the buy sell index for institutional investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is 
the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and 
AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the 
commercial real estate market respectively. SPR is the default risk premium (spread) defined as difference 
between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. TRM is the term structure defined as 
difference between the yields of the 10-year treasury bond and 3-month treasury bill. UNP is the unemployment 
rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. SPINDEX is a binary variable coded 1 for quarters in which a 
REIT was included in an S&P index. INSTOWN is the percentage of institutional ownership in a REIT The 
reported R2 is the overall R2 resulting from the respective within and between R2s. 
 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.  
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Table 7: Results for BSIINST by Property Type and Time Period 
 
 Office Industrial Retail Residential Hotel 
 2002-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2002-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2002-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2002-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
2002-
2006 
2007-
2009 
2010-
2012 
                
RERCSENT  0.07 -0.42** -0.03  0.43** -0.54** -0.10  0.14*** -0.35*** -0.11 -0.10** -0.66*** -0.00  0.40** -0.05 -0.22** 
AMILLIQREIT  0.97 -0.02  0.50  1.86  -0.67  -0.41  0.00  -0.01   0.19 -0.17  -0.41   3.81** -0.06  0.10 -0.69 
AMILLIQMARKET  2.69 12.36* 11.68 -4.76  10.15   6.05  6.50**  3.36   20.69*  5.85*  7.96  -2.24  15.07   5.72   51.83** 
AMILLIQCOM 23.99**  0.07   2.73  6.92  -6.94   1.21 16.65***  1.17   0.63 15.68* -11.47**  16.75  116.70   16.94  -46.20 
BSIMF  0.04   0.16    0.15*  0.15   0.16   0.08  0.11*  0.18**  0.14***  0.10   0.30**  0.13**  0.02   0.24  0.01 
INSTOWN -0.01  0.00   0.00 -0.00   0.00  0.01 -0.00   0.01***  0.00 -0.00   0.03***  0.01** -0.01   0.01   0.01 
SPINDEX  0.06  0.11  -0.44* -0.19    -0.07   0.09   0.11 -0.22  -0.10   0.02    
SPR -0.42*** -0.08   0.40 -0.27   0.08   0.57 -0.38*** -0.16   0.10 -0.57***  0.07  -2.16** -0.40* -0.14   3.35* 
TRM  0.23***  0.26  -0.06  0.31    0.02  -0.10  0.11*  0.35**  0.18  0.37***  0.25    1.06**  0.29   0.46  -1.34 
UNP  1.43*** -0.24*** -0.05  1.31** -0.34** -0.16  1.51*** -0.25*** -0.14  1.28*** -0.21***  0.41***  1.24** -0.11  -0.61* 
SNP -0.02  0.08** -0.00 -0.00   0.13**  0.00 -0.05***  0.08**  0.01 -0.03**  0.07***  0.01 -0.08**  0.04  -0.03 
Constant -6.02***  0.47  -1.27 -6.25**  0.68  -1.91 -7.15*** -0.04   0.03 -4.79***  2.15*  4.39 -7.44** -0.38  -8.48 
                
                
Firm-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.53 0.46 0.12 0.15 0.47 0.22 0.54 0.24 0.13 0.49 0.08 0.23 0.63 0.33 0.11 
N (n) 188 (11) 84 (10) 84(11) 41 (3) 33 (3) 34(4) 441 (24) 247(24) 221(25) 216 (11) 106(11) 102(11) 54 (4) 49(5) 68(7) 
                
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of BSIINST on the following variables using fixed effects linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are 
reported for different property types and three distinct time periods. RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment in different typological commercial real 
estate markets and is based on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell index for 
institutional investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds investing in individual REITs. 
AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real estate 
market respectively. SPINDEX is a binary variable coded 1 for quarters in which a REIT was included in an S&P index.  SPR is the default risk premium (spread) 
defined as difference between yield of BAA rated corporate bond and 1yr treasury bond. TRM is the term structure defined as difference between the yields of the 
10-year treasury bond and 3-month treasury bill. UNP is the unemployment rate. SNP is the return on the S&P500 index. INSTOWN is the percentage of 
institutional ownership in a REIT. The reported R2 is the overall R2 resulting from the respective within and between R2s.  
 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Table 8: Results for REIT Return Separated by S&P and Non-S&P REITs and Time Period 
 
  2002-2006 2007-2009 2010-2012 
 Full 
Sample 
S&P Non-
S&P 
S&P Non-
S&P 
S&P Non-
S&P 
RERCSENT  3.62***  2.65***  3.22***  2.27  9.66**  3.28*  0.03 
MKT  0.60***  0.28*  0.21***  0.97***  1.00***  0.62***  0.70*** 
SMB  0.50***  0.71***  0.83***  0.69  1.93**  3.17***  2.94* 
HML  1.11***  0.08  0.26**  1.45***  0.95 -2.67*** -1.52 
MOM  0.83***  0.54  0.60***  2.21**  1.13 -0.22  0.62 
AMILLIQMA  0.05  2.14***  0.11***  0.54**  0.06 -0.15  0.02 
lagRETREIT -0.06*** -0.30*** -0.27*** -0.13** -0.05 -0.22*** -0.12* 
lagRERCSENT -4.06*** -1.35 -1.97*** -4.53* -7.42** -0.45  1.88 
Constant  2.40*** -1.02  1.79**  3.97**  5.32 -7.83** -4.37 
Fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R2 0.47 0.16 0.30 0.56 0.51 0.48 0.50 
N (n) 1677 (68) 183 (21) 625 (57) 237 (34) 218 (37) 248 (42) 166 (30) 
 
Note: This table presents the results for the regression of REIT returns (RETREIT) on the following variables using 
firm-fixed effects linear regression (unbalanced panels). Results are reported for the full sample, REITs that are in an 
S&P index and those that are not for three distinct time periods. RERCSENT measures institutional investor sentiment 
in different typological commercial real estate markets and is based on the “investment conditions” item in the RERC 
survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. MKT, SMB, HML and MOM are the four systematic risk factors. 
AMILLIQMA is the mean-adjusted Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  
 
‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively. 
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Figure 1: Correlation of Institutional Investor Sentiment in the Private Market (RERCSENT) 
and REIT Trading Behavior (BSIINST) Over Time 
 
 
 
Note: This figure graphically presents the correlation between institutional investor sentiment in the commercial 
real estate market (RERCSENT) and institutional trading behavior in REITs (BSIINST) over the period of Q1/2002 to 
Q2/2012. The X-axis measures time in year and quarter. The left Y-axis measures RERCSENT while the right Y-axis 
measures BSIINST.  
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Appendix 
 
 
Table A1: Data Description and Sources 
 
Variable Definition Derivation Source 
RERCSENT Commercial real estate 
market sentiment of 
institutional investors 
“Investment conditions” in RERC survey; 
principal common analysis used for property 
types with more than one segment (office, 
industrial, retail, diversified) to derive a score 
Quarterly survey of 
institutional investors by Real 
Estate Research Corporation 
(RERC)  
BSIINST Buy sell index of 
institutional investors; 
BSIINST>0 (net buyers); 
BSIINST<0 (net sellers) 
BSIt =
(Bt - St )
(Bt + St )
 
Where Bt (St) is the quarterly long (short) 
position of institutional investors in a particular 
REIT. 
Institutional (13f) Holdings 
database (s34) in Thomson 
Reuters 
BSIMF Buy sell index of mutual 
funds; BSIMF>0 (net 
buyers); BSIMF<0 (net 
sellers) 
BSIt =
(Bt - St )
(Bt + St )
 
Where Bt (St) is the quarterly long (short) 
position of mutual funds in a particular REIT. 
Mutual Fund Holdings 
database (s12) in Thomson 
Reuters 
AMILLIQREIT Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure for an individual 
REIT 
 
Where R is the absolute return and VOL the total 
trading volume for a particular REIT.  
CRSP 
AMILLIQMARKET Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure for the REIT 
market 
Quarterly value-weighted (by market 
capitalization) aggregate of the REIT-level 
illiquidity values. 
CRSP 
AMILLIQCOM Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measure for the 
commercial real estate 
market 
 
Where R is the absolute quarterly property-type 
specific NCREIF transaction based index (NTBI) 
total return and VOL is the dollar-denominated 
NCREIF 
ILLIQiy =
| Riy |
VOLiy
ILLIQiy =
| Riy |
VOLiy
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trading volume for a particular property type.  
SPR Default risk premium Difference between yields of BAA rated 
corporate bond and 1 year treasury bond 
Federal reserve, 
COMPUSTAT 
TRM Term structure  Difference between yields of 10 year T-bond and 
3 month T-bill 
Federal Reserve 
UNP Control for overall 
economy 
Unemployment rate (national) Bureau of Labor Statistics 
SNP Control for general stock 
market 
Return on S&P 500 composite index CRSP 
SPINDEX Inclusion in S&P index Binary variable coded 1 for quarters in which an 
individual REIT was included in the S&P400, 
500 or 600 index 
NAREIT 
INSTOWN Institutional ownership in 
an individual REIT 
Total institutional ownership as a percentage of 
shares outstanding 
Thomson Reuters 
RETREIT Individual REIT returns Quarterly returns for individual REITs CRSP 
MKT Market Risk Premium See Fama French (1993) Fama French Factors 
(WRDS) 
SMB Small Minus Big factor See Fama French (1993) Fama French Factors 
(WRDS) 
HML High Minus Low factor See Fama French (1993) Fama French Factors 
(WRDS) 
MOM Momentum Factor See Carhart (1997) Fama French Factors 
(WRDS) 
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Table A2: Descriptive Statistics by Period 
 
 Period Mean Median Std. Dev Minimum Maximum 
RERCSENT 2002-2006 1.79 1.04 2.50 -1.89 6.8 
 2007-2009 -0.43 -1.26 3.58 -6.57 6.4 
 2010-2012 1.79 0.62 3.13 -3.00 7.5 
BSIINST 2002-2006 0.12 0.24 0.54 -1.00 1.00 
 2007-2009 0.10 0.16 0.42 -1.00 0.93 
 2010-2012 0.29 0.28 0.25 -0.38 1.00 
BSIMF 2002-2006 0.56 0.61 0.32 -0.93 1.00 
 2007-2009 0.45 0.49 0.27 -0.61 1.00 
 2010-2012 0.40 0.42 0.34 -0.73 1.00 
AMILLIQREIT 2002-2006 0.12 0.03 0.37 0.00 5.05 
 2007-2009 0.11 0.02 0.26 0.00 2.56 
 2010-2012 0.06 0.01 0.11 0.00 0.94 
AMILLIQMARKET 2002-2006 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.07 
 2007-2009 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.05 
 2010-2012 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 
AMILLIQCOM 2002-2006 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03 
 2007-2009 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10 
 2010-2012 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.08 
SPINDEX 2002-2006 0.22 0 0.41 0 1 
 2007-2009 0.51 1 0.50 0 1 
 2010-2012 0.60 1 0.49 0 1 
INSTOWN 2002-2006 64.79 71.27 24.53 0.09 100 
 2007-2009 76.43 81.25 18.17 20.51 100 
 2010-2012 77.50 82.47 18.79 8.39 100 
RETREIT 2002-2006 5.71 6.16 9.13 -40.84 30.56 
 2007-2009 -0.15 -0.41 29.92 -145.84 203.17 
 2010-2012 4.85 5.73 14.37 -60.39 98.46 
 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics for our dataset for a sample of 2,357 REIT quarters (68 REITs) 
over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012, separated by period. The period of 2002 to 2006 covers 1112 REIT 
quarters, 2007 to 2009 covers 638 REIT quarters and 2010 to 2012 covers 607 REIT quarters. RERCSENT measures 
institutional investor sentiment in the commercial real estate market and is based on the “investment conditions” 
item in the RERC survey over the period of Q1/2002 to Q2/2012. BSIINST is the buy sell index for institutional 
investors in individual REITs in line with Kumar and Lee (2006). BSIMF is the buy sell index for mutual funds 
investing in individual REITs. AMILLIQREIT, AMILLIQMARKET and AMILLIQCOM are the Amihud (2002) illiquidity 
measures for individual REITs, the REIT market and the commercial real estate market respectively. SPINDEX is 
coded 1 for quarters in which a REIT is included in the S&P 400, 500 or 600 index. INSTOWN is the percentage of 
institutional ownership in a REIT. RETREIT is the quarterly return for a particular REIT.  
 
 
 
